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ESCAPING TOXIC CONTRACTS: HOW WE 
HAVE LOST THE WAR ON ASSENT IN 
WRAP CONTRACTS 
Daniel D. Barnhizer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consumers (and by extension contract s·cholars who make their living 
worrying about wrap contracts, adhesion, the duty to read, 
unconscionability, reasonable expectations, and the like) have lost the war 
on clickwrap, browsewrap, boilerplate, disclosure, and thus on adhesion 
contracts altogether. 
Wait. No. That's not right. In reality, consumers don't even know there 
is a war on boilerplate and wrap contracts. Consumers as a class don't know 
much at all. They just want "stuff," and they want that stuff cheap. They 
are, in fact, generally little more than appetitive identities wrapped around a 
credit card and a paycheck. Expecting them to engage in anything like 
rational behavior, Chicago-school, boundedly rational, or otherwise, often 
seems unrealistic. 
As Nancy Kim's Wrap Contracts1 suggests, there is no meaningful 
way to prevent producers from using adhesive contracts to extract whatever 
set of terms they choose from consumers, employees, franchisees, and other 
adherents. We, as adherents, assent blindly to every indignity that paper and 
wrap form contract drafters can pile on us. We routinely provide personal 
financial information for five percent discounts or free shipping, divulge 
our images and pictures in exchange for convenient online file storage and 
the chance to tell our friends of our latest imbroglios, and yield our 
psychological security to firms who experiment on us for profit.2 There is, it 
* Professor of Law and Bradford Stone Faculty Scholar, Michigan State University College 
of Law. The author thanks Brent Domann, Jacqueline Kittel, and Timothy Lee for their invaluable 
research and sounding board assistance with this project. 
1. NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013). 
2. See Vindu Goel, As Data Overflows Online, Researchers Grapple with Ethics, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014 ), http://www.nytimes.com/20 14/08/13/technology/the-boon-of-online-data-
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seems, literally nothing that we will not give up for the chance to participate 
in the modem, technological marketplace. In the wrap contract context, we 
are our own worst enemies. 
The problem is that much of contracts scholarship regarding adhesive 
contracts generally, and wrap contracts specifically, focuses on a symptom 
of the problem - lack of assent to the terms of the wrap contract - and 
consequent attempts to cure that symptom. But policing the quality of 
assent in the wrap context is a low value strategy unlikely to yield better 
results than adherents already get from drafters. This Essay proposes that 
the problem of abusive terms in wrap contracts requires strategic attention 
to three phases of the contracting process, not just formation. Instead of 
focusing primarily on the obvious problems of assent, notice, commercial 
reasonableness, and other factors relevant to the moment of formation, 
contract law responses to wrap contracts must address power imbalances 
before, at, and after contract formation and enforcement. 
Specifically, in terms of improving consumer bargaining power, legal 
tools such as judging the quality of assent at the formation stage and 
examining the unconscionability of terms at the enforcement stage are 
inefficient and ineffective. By the time the adherent has made a purchase 
decision, as Kim observes, that transaction will likely occur regardless of 
the presence or absence of abusive terms in the proposed wrap agreement. 
Likewise, the inefficiencies of policing contracts post hoc through 
unconscionability or regulatory and legislative interventions are inefficient, 
particularly in light of strong jurisprudence favoring mandatory binding 
arbitration. But it is possible that the time of contracting is not the best 
moment for promoting the ability of adherents to affect the terms of their 
transactions or to protect themselves against predatory or pathological 
contract terms. 
II. CONSUMER ASSENT AND THE PROBLEM OF WRAP CONTRACTS 
When I say that adherents in the wrap contract context have lost the 
boilerplate contest, I mean that only in a narrow sense. Adherents-
generally consumers-have no ability to change the outcome of the wrap 
contracting process. Adherent assent merely indicates that a deal has been 
made. Outside of the most basic terms of the agreement, such as price, 
puts-social-science-in-a-quandary.html (describing a study in which Facebook "quietly 
manipulated the news feeds of nearly 700,000 people to learn how the changes affected their 
emotions."); Molly Woodjuly, OKCupid Plays with Love in User Experiments, N.Y. TIMES (July 
28, 20 14), http://www.nytimes.com/20 14/07/29/technology/okcupid-publishes-findings-of-user-
experiments.html#story-continues-6. 
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attributes of the good or service, warranty, and shipping, every other term 
has been predetermined and predestined by the drafter. Whether the 
adherent consents to these contract terms is an irrelevant and fictional 
convenience to the dominant contracting party. As Kim suggests, assent in 
adhesive contracts now really means "acquiescence rather than active 
agreement."3 
Courts apply to the wrap context contracting norms that were 
developed for a traditional paper-contracting paradigm. These norms likely 
did not reflect the reality of contracting even in that slower and "gentler" 
golden age of standard form contracts of adhesion. These norms include an 
objective presumption that adherents signing a written agreement are at 
least on notice that they are engaging in a legally meaningful interaction 
with the drafter.4 In the paper world, multi-page contracts in fine print not 
only alert the adherent that something legally significant is happening, but 
the amount of paper involved- especially in low value transactions - may 
make the adherent skittish about entering the transaction at all.5 In the 
online world, adherents barely even register that they are engaging in a 
contract. 6 The judicial model of the reasonable party who has the 
opportunity to read the contract terms breaks down completely in that 
electronic context. As Kim notes: 
Courts have imposed a duty to read on contracts of adhesion of all kinds, 
without distinguishing that these contracts may have different functions-
and that in many cases it is not reasonable for a party to actually read the 
terms. This fiction that all contracts are the same derived from the notion 
of blanket assent, which itself developed out of the objective theory of 
contracts. 7 
Contract scholarship for the last seventy-plus years has recognized this 
disconnect between the subjective reality of actual assent to contract, and 
the objective manifestation of assent necessary to form a contract. The idea 
that an adherent objectively manifests assent to the substantive terms of the 
contract is a fiction piled upon fiction. 
3. See KIM, supra note 1, at 27. 
4. Cf Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 303 
(1986). Barnett's consent theory of contract represents a coherent, albeit minimalist, justification 
of the moral basis of contract, particularly with respect to whether courts may legitimately enforce 
adhesive contracts containing terms to which the adhering party did not actually agree (and with 
which that party might not have agreed if it had been made salient). 
5. See KIM, supra note 1, at 58 ("An unusually hefty document for a minor transaction is 
likely to arouse the customer's suspicion."). 
6. See id. at 134. 
7. !d. at 194 (emphasis in original). 
218 SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
Perhaps as a consequence of the glaringly obvious conclusion that 
adherents do not actually assent to the terms of their adhesive contracts, 
much of contracts scholarship on the issue (my own included8) fixates on 
improving the quality of assent in both paper and wrap contracts of 
adhesion. Although variations,.combinations, and radically novel solutions 
exist, most commonly, assent-based arguments suggest requiring an 
increased level of consent by the adherent, or an increased level of 
disclosure by the drafter. 
In the former instance, some may suggest only enforcing contract terms 
for which the adherent makes some additional manifestation of assent 
beyond mere clicking or signing. This might be accomplished by requiring 
certain terms to be in a separate writing executed by the parties concurrently 
with the main contract. Alternatively, paragraphs requiring additional 
indicia of assent might require that the parties initial next to those terms in 
order to make those terms enforceable. Kim's concept of "specific assent" 
fits within this model by requiring drafters to obtain an affirmative click or 
other indicia of consent from the consumer for each term in the wrap 
contract.9 
In the latter case, improving the quality of assent means improving the 
quality of disclosures given adherents before formation. Rather than the 
"notice of terms equals disclosure of terms" logic that Kim describes as the 
starting point for much judicial reasoning on wrap contracts, 10 disclosure 
based solutions to the problem of assent require some effort to make the 
adhesive terms actually salient to the adherent. 11 Disclosure mechanisms 
may be legislatively required, such as with form disclosures in the lending 
and automobile purchasing contexts. Alternatively, some scholars propose 
that adhesive contract terms should not be enforceable absent some extra 
8. See generally, Daniel D. Bamhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 139, 141 (2005). 
9. See KIM, supra note I, at 195-99 (suggesting multiple models for obtaining specific 
consent to individual contract terms, such as individualized click boxes nested within each 
contract provision, emailed consent typed by the adherent and sent to the drafter, or "facsimile" 
contracting software requiring the adherent to type their name at the bottom of an electronic form 
rather than simply clicking "I accept"). 
10. See id. at 93-109; see also Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case 
for Using "Knowing Assent" as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-For Terms in Standard 
Form Contracts, 31 SEA TILE U. L. REV. 469,472 (2008). 
II. But see 0MRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO 
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 33-54 (2014) (reviewing empirical evidence 
regarding the inefficacy of disclosure mandates). 
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(or even extraordinary) effort by drafters to inform adherents of those 
terms. 12 
The problem with attempting to resolve problems relating to wrap 
contracts through "better" forms of assent is that even the best quality 
assent likely will not improve the quality of the resulting contract. 
Especially in the online context, adherents typically receive contract terms 
after they have invested time, effort, and emotions in researching, shopping, 
selecting, and committing to the purchase. In many contracting contexts, 
producers structure the transaction to minimize opportunities for the 
consumer to reject the transaction. As Kim observes, in many clickwrap 
situations users are presented with the precarious option of either clicking 
the "I Accept" button or clicking on the hyperlink to the contract terms and 
risking the loss of their shopping cart. 
In most contracting situations--even many dickered bargains-assent 
does not actually serve a significant filtering function over the terms of the 
parties' agreement. First, producers have far more information about the 
likelihood that risks contracted for in the agreement will materialize. Thus, 
in a typical online transaction, only the producer will know the actual rate 
of dissatisfied customers and disputes requiring application of a choice of 
forum, choice of law, or arbitration clause. Adherents cannot determine 
whether those terms have any value. Asking for their specific assent to 
those terms will not in itself improve the quality of the bargain. 
Second, producers have complete information about how they might 
exercise discretion in their contracts. Recent news stories disclosed that at 
least two social networking firms-Facebook and OKCupid-conducted 
human subject experiments on their users, allegedly justified by the 
providers' Terms of Service ("TOS"). I submit that no reasonable user-
again assuming they reviewed the TOS carefully before clicking assent-
would have foreseen the likelihood that either provider would intentionally 
manipulate their users' emotional and psychological state for science and 
profit. 
Third, as I have argued elsewhere, 13 in the wrap context producers 
could still control the final terms even if they provided users with the 
opportunity to select between competing alternative contract terms for 
every term in the contract. Specifically, assume that a clickwrap agreement 
abandons the traditional aU-or-nothing approach and instead offers 
12. See, e.g., Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1307, 1337-38 (2005). 
13. See Damel D. Barnhizer, Reassessing Assent-Based Critiques in Adheswn Contracts, in 
COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW: BRITISH AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (Larry A. DiMatteo & 
Martin Hogg eds.) (forthcoming 2015). 
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customers the ability to select arbitration versus litigation, home forum 
versus producer forum, choice of law, presence or absence of exculpatory 
clauses, insurance, type of shipping, length of warranty, color, and other 
alternatives. As Kim suggests, this selective assent process could take the 
form of consumers having to click "accept/reject" or a similar indication of 
assent next to each term,14 with the producer free to determine whether to 
accept the consumer's preferred terms upon presentation. Alternatively, as 
Margaret Radin proposes, consumers could customize their contract terms, 
choosing between a free arbitration clause and an additional $2 for the right 
to litigate. 15 
But the reality is that so long as producers control the prices at which 
they offer goods or services or boilerplate contract terms, the price effects 
induced by such control will permit producers to determine the final 
outcome of the parties' agreement. Instead of offering the choice between 
arbitration and litigation at or near cost, for example, a producer who favors 
arbitration may price the litigation alternative beyond the value that all but a 
few consumers would place upon that term. Likewise with class action 
waivers-if the producer prices the right to participate in class actions 
appropriately it would be irrelevant if a few oddball customers and 
plaintiffs' lawyers paid for that right. Class actions involving only an 
extremely small percentage of the total customer base are unlikely to yield 
the jackpot payoff potential that could attract and maintain effective class 
action litigation. 16 
The possible examples are legion, but the ultimate point is that, even 
assuming such pricing strategies, this type of selective assent is real assent. 
With a sufficiently large number of possible choices, consumers could 
selectively develop a contract that looks like clickwrap but nonetheless has 
a quality of assent associated with the final agreement that is 
indistinguishable from-or may even be superior to-a fully dickered 
agreement. 17 
Importantly, the availability of finely grained selections in a clickwrap 
contract may be counterproductive in much the same way as Robert 
Hillman argues with respect to improving the quality and types of 
14. See KIM, supra note l, at 196-97. 
15. Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1144 (2002). 
16. See BARNHIZER, supra note 13. 
17. Reassessing Assent-Based Critiques explores a number of additional alternatives on this 
theme, up to and including a clickwrap contract providing two choices: "I Accept" and "I would 
like to negotiate this contract from scratch with [producer's] general counsel and agree to pay 
$250 per hour to producer for this privilege." See id at 13. 
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mandatory disclosures in standard form contracts. Hillman observes that 
"[ m ]andatory website disclosure [of adhesive contract terms] may backfire, 
however, because it may not increase reading or shopping for terms or 
motivate businesses to draft reasonable ones, but instead, may make 
heretofore suspect terms more likely enforceable."18 
Improving the quality of assent, by itself, may similarly undermine post 
hoc attempts to overturn the bargain through common law doctrines such as 
unconscionability. Indeed, such particularized selective assent may interfere 
even with more stringent regulatory regimes such as EU consumer 
protection directives that prohibit enforcement of certain standard contract 
terms, unless those terms were "individually negotiated." 19 The ability of 
adherents to customize significant portions of the contract will likely make 
courts even more reluctant to overturn the resulting agreement. If adherents 
are still unlikely to read the contract, understand the contract, and foresee 
possible risks and discretionary actions under the contract, and are sensitive 
to producer pressure on pricing contract terms, they will not benefit from 
the chance to give high-quality assent. 
There will, of course, always be marginal cases in which adherents 
manage to manipulate their end of the formation process to gain an 
advantage over a careless drafter. For example, Dmitry Agarkov carefully 
redrafted credit card terms he received from a Russian bank, Tinkoff Credit 
Systems, to provide for a 0% interest rate and multiple penalty clauses. 
Tinkoff approved the contract without reading it, and later sued Agarkov for 
an unpaid balance?0 A Russian court held that Agarkov's terms controlled. 
The parties later settled, apparently on terms favorable to Agarkov.21 
Similarly, a cadre of Linux operating system users have successfully 
rejected clickwrap and shrinkwrap agreements relating to the Windows 
18. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of£-
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837,839 (2006). 
19. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Tenns in Consumer 
Contracts, pmbl., 1993 O.J. (L 95/29) 2 ("Whereas, ... only contractual terms which have not 
been individually negotiated are covered by this Directive ... "); European Communities (Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations, 1995 European Communities (Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts) Regulation, 1995, § 3, § 3; OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, UNFAIR CONTRACT 
TERMS GUIDANCE: GUIDANCE FOR THE UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
REGULATIONS 1999,2008, at 9 (U.K.). 
20. $700k Windfall: Russian Man Outwits Bank with Handwritten Credit Contract, RUSSIA 
TODAY (Aug. 8, 20 13), http://rt.com/business/man-outsmarts-banks-wins-court-221. 
21. See Man Who Outwitted Bank Ends $700K Lawsuit, THE Moscow TIMES (Aug. 15, 
2013 ), http://www. themoscowtimes.com/news/article/man-who-outwitted-bank -ends-700klaw 
suit/484588.html. 
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operating system bundled with their computer hardware purchases.22 The 
Microsoft Windows End-User Licensing Agreement ("EULA") provides 
that "[b]y using the software [the Microsoft Windows operating system], 
you accept these terms. If you do not accept them, do not use the software. 
Instead, return it to the retailer for a refund or credit."23 Successful 
claimants of this "Windows Tax Refund" receive modest checks-ranging 
from $50 to $115-after days of effort.24 
Ian Ayres has suggested another potential mechanism for consumers to 
fight back against wrap contract formation in the EULA context. With 
Barry Nalebuff, Ayres developed the "LiabiliT," which is a t-shirt bearing 
the legend, "NOTICE Management, by serving me, is responsible for any 
losses to my person or property that result from my use of this 
establishment."25 The Small Print Project-a blog on user experiences with 
EULAs that originated out of a class at USC's Annenberg School for 
Communication-has taken Ayres' concept further, producing the "anti-
EULA." This notice-available in t-shirt, bumper sticker, or simply cut-
and-paste form-purports to bind all readers to release the presenter from 
all non-negotiated contracts of adhesion, including wrap contracts. 26 
But these examples and others, like Ornri Ben-Shahar's anecdote of a 
website offering in its TOS $100 to any reader who claimed it, 27 or my own 
quixotic attempt to reject KlearGear.com's TOS without "using" their 
website, are themselves pathological. The people who can spend six months 
rewriting standard credit card terms, the people who hate Microsoft so 
much that they are willing to spend weeks of their lives to claw back $100 
worth of refunds, the people who pay for an EULA t-shirt that will at best 
22. See, e.g., Chris Clay, Linux Users, Get Your Windows Refund Today, ZDNET (Feb. 10, 
20 I 0), http://www.zdnet.com/linux-users-get-your-windows-refund-today-40 I 00 15089/; 
Microsoft Windows Refund, SCRATCHPAD, http://scratchpad.wikia.com/wiki/Microsoft_ Windows 
_refund. 
23. Gavin Clarke, Dell Refunds PC User for Rejecting Windows, THE REGISTER (Oct. 19, 
2009), http://www. theregister.co. uk/2009/1 0/19/windows _ dell_linux _refund. Other permutations 
of the Microsoft Windows EULA exist, but generally follow this pattern. 
24. See id. ($115 refund) (citing Graeme Cobbett, Get a Refund for Your Microsoft Windows 
License, GWA.TUMBLR.COM (Oct. 15, 2009), ; http://gwa.tumblr.com (detailing refund request 
entailing two months of effort and fourteen email exchanges); Serge Wroclawski, How to Get a 
Windows Tax refund, LINUX.COM (Jan. 5, 2007), http://archive09.1inux.com/articles/59381 
($52.50 refund and detailing steps for seeking refunds). 
25. Ian Ayres, EULA Wars: The Customer Is Always Right. . . to Lodge a Protest, 
FREAKANOMICS (Nov. 21, 2007), http://freakonomics.com/2007/ll/21/eula-wars-the-customer-is-
always-right-to-lodge-a-protest. 
26. ReasonableAgreement.org, THE SMALL PRINT PROJECT, http://smallprint.netzoo.net/ 
reag/ (last visited Aug. 22, 20 14). 
27. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note II, at II. 
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start a battle of the forms, are nerds or freaks. Such acts are almost heroic, 
but normal people don't do this. 
Moreover, these examples also suffer from being entirely too cute. Not 
only are they time-consuming and difficult to achieve, but they also alert 
repeat players to protect against such shenanigans. Such protections may 
involve internal changes in procedure or contract forms. Alternatively, 
repeat players have incentives to invest in higher-quality legislative and 
regulatory representation than do one-shot contracting parties. 
Finally, and potentially more worrisome from a contract law 
perspective, producers have significant incentives to manipulate 
commercial norms. For example, the recent announcement by OKCupid, in 
response to complaints about the site deliberately matching incompatible 
users to see what would happen, is not just an exercise in gross hubris, but 
also an attempt to establish new norms regarding commercially reasonable 
applications of social media TOS. OKCupid was unapologetic for engaging 
in potentially unethical research designed to manipulate the emotional states 
of its users for fun and profit-"But guess what, everybody: if you use the 
Internet, you're the subject of hundreds of experiments at any given time, 
on every site. That's how websites work."28 Although possibly not 
intentional, this response nonetheless has the potential to influence future 
determinations of commercial reasonableness with regard to use of adherent 
information-it is not difficult to imagine future users having no qualms 
whatsoever about social media websites deliberately manipulating their 
emotions and mental states to improve profitability. The majority of 
comments following OKCupid's un-apology already show that is the case 
for that set of users. 
Ill. AN INTEGRA TED RESPONSE TO WRAP CONTRACT ABUSES 
If focusing on the assent stage of a contract provides a low return in 
terms of preventing predatory activity by wrap contract drafters, what is 
left? The assent process is attractive because it is the point at which 
adherents theoretically could get better terms or deprive the producer of a 
deal by walking away. If strengthening that process will not yield 
significant benefits, what will? 
Parties have the ability to affect the outcome of a transaction-i.e., 
improve their bargaining power-at three stages in the transaction: ex ante, 
at the time of formation, and post hoc. After the assent stage, post hoc 
solutions have likely received the most attention. These include common 
28. Christian Rudder, We Experiment on Human Beings!, OKTRENDS (July 28, 2014), 
http:/fblog.okcupid.com/index.php/we-experirnent-on-hurnan-beings. 
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law responses, such as unconscionability and the reasonable expectations 
doctrines and public law statutory and regulatory regimes, that purport to 
undo or reform abusive contract terms. In both situations, the parties form a 
contract, a dispute arises, and the adherent later seeks to have the contract 
or a term declared unenforceable because of a defect in the term or the 
drafter's exercise of discretion in interpreting and applying that term. These 
doctrines differ from formation doctrines such as notice and assent in that 
doctrines relating to formation affect the volition of the parties to enter a 
contract. Theoretically, the formation stage is the least costly point at which 
parties could avoid the dispute, simply by adjusting problematic terms or 
refusing to enter the deal altogether. In contrast, post hoc policing is 
necessarily expensive and inefficient. Changes to abusive contracting 
behavior happen, if at all, only through deterrence and related reputational 
mechanisms. Similarly, post hoc policing requires involvement of third 
parties in the transaction, also increasing costs of regulating abusive wrap 
contracting. 
Private post hoc policing mechanisms also regulate abusive contract 
terms or behavior by drafters. Information era contracting involves radically 
increased bargaining power on the part of consumers as a group. 
Consumers quickly disseminate reputational information about abusive 
firms through social media. In some industries, third party aggregators, such 
as TripAdvisor.com, AngiesList.com, and even seller ratings on sites like 
eBay and Amazon, facilitate the development and evaluation of reputation 
information regarding seller performance under their contracts. In some 
cases, consumers successfully utilize social media on their own to damage 
the reputations of firms that behave abusively. One famous example of a 
consumer complaint posted on YouTube.com-Dave Carroll's "United 
Breaks Guitars" music video-may have caused $180 million in lost share 
value from the negative publicity.29 
But both public and private post hoc policing mechanisms are subject 
to later limitation by the producer. As noted above, producers, as repeat 
players, have strong incentives to limit the ability of one-shot players to 
damage their reputation. Oliver Wendell Holmes, in discussing the 
bargaining power of management and workers in labor contracts and 
disputes, emphasized that the proper and natural response to any position of 
power is for the weaker party to seek to create a competing position: 
"Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the 
29. Sons of Maxwell, United Breaks Guitars, YouTUBE (July 6, 2009), https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=5YGc4zOqozo; see Kevin Hunt, 'United Breaks Guitars' Viral Video 
Maker on a New Mission, HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 9, 2012) ("Within days [of Carroll posting 
the video], fallout from nationwide publicity cost United shareholders $180 million."). 
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other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried 
on in a fair and equal way."3° For example, in May 2014 the European 
Union recognized individuals' "right to be forgotten" that requires Internet 
search engines such as Google to delete certain types of personal 
information. Since then, Google has been working to undermine, block, and 
change EU law regarding privacy of personal information.31 
In the private ordering context, at least some producers have 
incorporated non-disparagement and liquidated damages terms in their wrap 
contracts to reduce consumers' power to disseminate negative reviews. The 
now Internet-infamous firm K.learGear.com apparently submerged a non-
disparagement and $3,500 liquidated damages clause three hyperlinks deep 
in their browsewrap TOS when they purported to contract with John Palmer 
in late 2008 for a $20 keychain.32 Three years after John's wife, Jen Kulas, 
wrote a negative review of the company on RipOffR.eport.com, a consumer 
complaints aggregation website, KlearGear claimed that John had breached 
the non-disparagement term and, when the Palmers refused to pay the 
demanded $3,500, referred them to a collection agency.33 In June 2014, the 
Palmers received a $306,750 default judgment against KlearGear for their 
federal claims asserting, among others, violations of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, defamation, intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.34 
While K.learGear never responded to the court, the company did send a 
public statement to the media. In justifying its browsewrap terms, 
KlearGear claimed such actions were necessary to counteract consumer 
power in social media: 
[Rude] customer behavior is rare but it has become a [sic] increasing 
problem for many companies today. DBS's [the alleged parent company 
ofKlearGear.com] head ofretail for North America ... cites this problem 
30. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
31. Benjamin Fox, EU Justice Chief Criticizes Google on 'Right to be Forgotten', 
EUOBSERVER.COM (Aug. 19, 2014), http://euobserver.com/news/125290. 
32. KlearGear.com currently buries these terms only two hyperlinks deep. See Email from 
Vic Mathieu, Dir. Corporate Comm'n, KlearGear.com to dubois1@dboutiques.fr, (May 19, 2014) 
("The structure of your [John Palmer's] sales contract, referenced in your order check-out screens 
which we have on file from December 22, 2008, had three forks (today there are two)"); see also 
Cyrus Farivar, KlearGear Must Pay $306,750 to Couple That Left Negative Review, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 25, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/kleargear-must-pay-
306750-to-couple-that-left-negative-review. The supposed two-fork structure is still well enough 
hidden that several contracts scholars interested in the case believed that the abusive terms had 
been removed from the KlearGear.com contract. 
33. See Farivar, supra note 32. 
34. See id; Complaint~~ 37-59 at 11-15, Palmer v. KlearGear.com Case No. I: 13-cv-00175 
(D. Utah Dec. 18, 2013). 
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as one of the reasons that we started to eliminate Kleargear.com's social 
media channels in 2012. While buySAFE protects our customers' interests 
on every transaction ... this track record is not public and dissatisfied 
h . 35 customers ave a stronger voice. 
Similar to the OKCupid example above, the company also attempted to 
justify its non-disparagement and liquidated damages clauses as normal and 
commercially reasonable: 
The non-disparagement agreements are not new among employees, 
partners and customers across the globe. There is no contract of adhesion; 
Kleargear.com operates in the consumer discretionary sector . . . so that 
consumers are free to shop elsewhere. 
* * * * 
If DBS is presented with an order for judgment on the above-mentioned 
civil action ... we will not honor it. In addition, such an invalid judicial 
resolution will not serve to dissuade Kleargear or other retailers from 
binding their customers to non-disparagement terms. 36 
Even if unintentional, these statements and the attitudes behind them 
clearly represent an attempt to establish new commercial norms of behavior 
that recognize such non-disparagement terms as normal and not unfairly 
surprising or unfair and deceptive. If such terms do become widespread, 
both common law doctrines, such as unconscionability and reasonable 
expectations, and statutory consumer protection regulations that are 
informed by commercial norms will be affected in favor of the drafters of 
such terms.37 Notably, the California legislature has responded to such 
attempts to control information in the market. California Civil Code 
§1670.8, enacted September 9, 2014, imposes civil penalties for any 
consumer contract that would waive "the consumer's right to make any 
statement regarding the seller or lessor or its employees or agents or 
concerning the goods or services." 
Abusive wrap contracts may also be policed ex ante, before the parties 
even initiate the transaction. As Kim's research suggests, by the time 
consumers have reached the contracting stage, producers have stacked the 
deck so much that there is no realistic possibility that the adherent will read, 
understand, or react to the proffered terms. Efforts at increasing the quality 
of assent are unlikely to yield significant benefits, and post hoc policing is 
both inefficient and relatively expensive. Consumers could, for instance, 
research and shop both the products and reputation of producers before 
35. Email from Vic Mathieu, Dir. Corporate Comm'n, KlearGear.com, to 
duboisl@dboutiques.fr, (May 21, 7014). 
36. Jd. 
37. SeeKlM,supranote l,at71-76. 
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initiating the transaction. Third party services such as complaint 
aggregation websites, automated reviews of EULA terms, 38 referral and 
preferred vendor services such as Angie's List, browser extensions, and 
even highly secure browsers such as the Tor or Puffm systems, all provide 
informational tools to consumers that allow them to either control to some 
extent the information they provide to producers or to avoid dealing with 
producers with poor reputations. 
But all of these tools are relatively useless for the vast majority of wrap 
contracts and consumers, simply because the consumers do not value them 
enough to use those tools in their transactions. Moreover, producers have 
invested heavily in informational advantages over consumers that permit 
them to target individual consumer weaknesses. While consumers attempt 
to fulfill their appetites, the logic of delayed gratification, investigation, 
shopping, and bargaining is forgotten. Producers effectively manipulate 
adherents through information on their weaknesses and desires, using their 
informational advantage to develop an evil electronic twin with which to 
whisper sweet transactional temptations into unsuspecting ears. If OK Cupid 
and Facebook are experimenting with manipulation of emotional and 
psychological states, the only certain conclusion is that they do those 
experiments for both science and profit. At the end of the day, the Internet 
will be won by those who can most successfully hijack consumers' minds 
and emotions to induce them to accept personal and financial obligations. 
In response, consumers must have additional tools for avoiding the 
entrapment or for limiting their exposure to temptation by the next "bright 
shiny" dangled in front of them. But online, such tools must be in demand, 
inexpensive, and invisible. Ian Ayres suggests, for example, using third 
party consumer aggregators, such as Google, to develop technological 
limitations on the types of terms to which consumers who use Google as 
their contracting portal can agree.39 Under this model, consumers would 
create a Google account that includes-besides all of the personal 
information they already give Google-a checklist ofEULA terms to which 
they would and would not agree. Google would then match the competing 
EULAs, and the vendor would be free to accept or reject to proposed new 
terms. Consumers would only see the transaction in the event their terms 
were rejected, presumably also giving them a chance to accept the 
producer's counteroffer. 
38. See, e.g., LEGALSIFTER, www.legalsifter.com (automated contract analyzer for creative 
project contracts) (last visited Aug. 21, 2014); EULA/yzer, BRIGHTFORT, http:// 
www.brightfort.com/eulalyzer.html#Overview (automated EULA analyzing software) (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2014). 
39. See Ayres, supra note 25. 
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Another possibility is to develop mechanisms for consumers to make 
greater use of disposable identities to limit their exposure to transaction 
risk.40 Tal Zarsky, for instance, argues persuasively for the use of 
"pseudonymous," traceable, virtual identities by consumers in online 
contexts. Similarly, consumers could incorporate or otherwise take 
advantage of existing or new corporate law mechanisms that would enable 
them to establish and fund multiple identities for use online. This model is 
attractive in terms of forcing consumers to consider ex ante the terms and 
extent of liability they are willing to accept from a transaction. Producers 
seeking to expand liability beyond the entity's limits would be forced to 
make the expansive terms salient to the consumer before formation. Many 
abusive terms are of limited use against an identity that can be discarded if 
it becomes too inconvenient. While unlikely to materialize any time soon, 
these types of ex ante responses are necessary to complete a strategic 
approach to regulating wrap contracting. 
N. CONCLUSION 
Kim's WRAP CONTRACTS is a critically important work in the rapidly 
evolving area of online contracting. It will be a seminal work in the next 
phase of scholarship responding to the problem of balancing the need to 
police abusive wrap contracting practices while maintaining the positive 
social benefits from legitimate uses of wrap mechanisms. One clear lesson 
from Kim's work is that, without radical restructuring of the process for 
giving and obtaining manifestations of assent to contract, consumers have 
no meaningful tools for protecting themselves from abusive terms in wrap 
contracts. 
Courts and legislatures must respond to new manifestations of 
bargaining power disparities, either by expanding existing tools or 
developing new ones. Ironically, the transactional phase during which 
abusive terms or behaviors may be avoided with the least cost, ex ante to 
the transaction, is also the phase in which contract law doctrinal responses 
are largely unresponsive except to preserve the capacity of consumers to 
access information about seller reputation. Nonetheless, third party 
solutions, such as promoting the ability of third parties to aggregate 
consumer bargaining power to demand better terms or developing the use of 
limited liability forms of disposable identities would permit consumers to 
40. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, 
and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet 
Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 991, 1015-20, 1030-35 (2004) (recognizing the capacity for online 
producers to manipulate Internet users' appetites). 
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control their exposure to fmancial and personal obligations resulting from 
wrap contracts. 
The final lesson, of course, is that none of these proposed solutions is 
permanent. As Holmes implies in his Vegelahn dissent, the competition for 
bargaining power between parties to a transaction is dynamic. Each 
development of a position of power by one party requires and causes the 
development of a countering position by the other. Producer and consumer 
developments in the wrap contracting context are rapid and often radical, 
and courts, regulators, and scholars often just need to get out of the way. 

